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DUTY TO ADVISE INDIGENT OF RIGHT
TO COUNSEL AT STATE EXPENSE
I. INTRODUCTION
Petitioner, hereinafter referred to as defendant, brought a
writ of error coram nobis in the Nebraska District Court to set aside
his robbery conviction, based on his guilty plea, on the ground
that he did not intelligently waive his right to counsel at his
arraignment. Defendant alleged a denial of due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment and of his constitutional and statutory
right to counsel under the law of Nebraska. Proof showed that the
trial court advised defendant that he was "entitled to be represented
by counsel," and that defendant misunderstood this to mean he
could have a lawyer only if he paid for one. The writ was denied,
and an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Nebraska. Held:
The trial court's statement sufficiently informed him of his con-
stitutional rights. Johnson v. State, 169 Neb. 783, 100 N.W.2d 844
(1960).
The court did not mention other facts appearing in the record.1
The defendant was seventeen; he had dropped out of school in the
ninth grade for medical reasons; he was married and father of a
child; he had had no previous experience with the law; and his
parents also misunderstood the court for his father was hard of
hearing and his mother answered the court's question about an
attorney by saying, "We can't afford it." The importance of these
facts will be brought out in discussing two issues raised by this
case: Are Nebraska judges under any duty to inform indigent de-
fendants of their right to counsel at state expense? Is this defendant
sufficiently "indigent" to qualify for counsel at state expense?
II. DUTY TO INFORM
Assuming that defendant was "indigent," does the judge have
a duty under Nebraska law to inform him of his right to counsel
at state expense? Broadly, there are two aspects to this question:
(1) Nebraska's duty under the Federal Constitution; and (2)
Nebraska's duty under her own Constitution and statute.
I These facts were taken from the statements of facts as given in the
Briefs for Appellant and Appellee, Johnson v. State, 169 Neb. 783, 100
N.W.2d 844 (1960).
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A. NEBRASKA'S FEDERAL DUTY
Although the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amend-
ment2 does not of itself apply to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it has long been clear that
the concept of "fundamental fairness" embodied in due process
requires the states to provide counsel for indigent criminal de-
fendants under some circumstances.3 Indeed, the right to counsel
at state expense for indigent defendants is absolute and subject
to no exceptions in capital cases, 4 though, to be sure, an intelligent
2 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . .
have the assistance of counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST., amend. VI.
All the states have similar provisions in their constitutions, except Vir-
ginia, which provides the right by statute. See Appendix, BEANEY,
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 237-39 (1955). For a list-
ing of early state statutes covering the indigent's right to counsel, see
also Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 467 (1942).
There has been a great deal of material written on the general subject
of right to counsel. The following list is far from complete:
23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 979 (1940); 14 AM. JUR. Criminal Law § 174
(1938).
Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 1003 (1949). See especially the cases cited in the
supplement service.
Annot., Accused's Right to Counsel Under the Federal Constitution, 93
L.Ed. 137 (1948) and 2 L.Ed.2d 1644 (1958). Other annotations on re-
lated subjects are footnoted in these annotations.
Note, 34 NEB. L. REV. 711 (1955); Fellman, The Constitutional Right
to Counsel in Federal Courts, 30 NEB. L. REV. 559 (1951); Fellman,
The Federal Right to Counsel in State Courts, 31 NEB. L. REV. 15
(1952); Fellman, The Right to Counsel Under State Law, 1955 WIS. L.
REV. 281 (1955); Balter, Assignment of Counsel in Federal Courts to
Defend Indigent Persons Accused of Crimes, 24 CALIF. S.B.J. 114
(1949); Holtzoff, The Right of Counsel under the Sixth Amendment,
20 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 1 (1944); Note, The Right to Benefit of Counsel
under the Federal Constitution, 42 COL. L. REV. 271 (1942); Comment,
The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 501
(1960).
Extensive bibliographies may be found on the subject in WHARTON,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2012-16 (1957) and BEANEY, supra, at
241-60 (1955).
3 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
4 ,,... [I]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ coun-
sel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of
ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of
the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a nec-
essary requisite of due process of law." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
71 (1932). See also Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945).
COMMENTS
waiver of counsel in a capital case would doubtless be sustained.5
On the other hand, due process probably does not, except in ex-
treme instances, require a state to appoint counsel for indigent
defendants in minor misdemeanor cases.6 Whether counsel must
be appointed for such defendants in non-capital felony and serious
misdemeanor cases is governed by the doctrine of Betts v. Brady.7
That case held that the right to counsel in such cases depends
upon the circumstances of each case and that due process requires
counsel at state expense only where the absence of counsel denies
the "essentials of liberty and justice."
The following cases will serve to illustrate the operation of the
Betts Doctrine. In Uvages v. Pennsylvania,9 a seventeen year-old
defendant pleaded guilty to four separate counts of burglary. Be-
cause of the defendant's age, inexperience, and the complexity of the
charges against him, failure of the state to appoint counsel in that
case was a denial of due process:
.. [E] ach case depends on its own facts. Where the gravity of the
crime and other factors-such as the age and education of the de-
fendant, the conduct of the court or prosecuting officials, and the
complicated nature of the offense charged and possible defenses
thereto-render criminal proceedings without counsel so apt to
result in injustice as to be fundamentally unfair . . . the accused
must have legal assistance . . . whether he pleads guilty or elects
to stand trial, whether he requests counsel or not.'0
In Pennsylvania v. Cloudy," defendant was arraigned on eight
charges of burglary, twelve charges of larceny, eight charges of
5 Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946); Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.S.
660 (1950).
6 Nullinian v. State, 156 Tex. Crim. 88, 238 S.W.2d 970 (1951); Kissinger
v. State, 147 Neb. 983, 25 N.W.2d 829 (1947); Brack v. State, 187 Md. 542,
51 A.2d 171 (1947). However, some states by statute provide that a per-
son accused of a misdemeanor has a right to appointed counsel. E.g., W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 6190 (Supp. 1953); COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 48 § 502(1952); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 775.16 (1948). On this subject see 48
CALIF. L. REV. 501, supra note 2.
7 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
8 Id. at 475.
9335 U.S. 437 (1948). Among the major cases construing the Betts case
are: Canizio v. New York, 327 U.S. 82 (1946); De Meerleer v. Michigan,
329 U.S. 663 (1947); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948); Gibbs v. Burke,
337 U.S. 733 (1949); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951); Palmer v.
Ashe, 342 U.S. 134 (1951); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957).
10 Uvages v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 441 (1948).
11350 U.S. 116 (1956). See also Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945), which
involved an Indian charged with burglary on a federal reservation who
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forgery and more. The Supreme Court held that no layman could
have understood the accusation and that the prisoner should there-
fore have been offered the right to be represented by counsel. In
Cash v. Cluver,12 decided only last year, a twenty year-old farm
boy was convicted of burglary and sentenced to fifteen years. He
had counsel at his first trial and the result was a hung jury. He
did not have counsel at his second trial because no attorney would
take his case for the fee his mother was able to offer. The Supreme
Court required Florida to provide him with counsel at state ex-
pense and failure to do so was held to be a denial of due process.
Applying Betts to the instant case, defendant Johnson was faced
with a grave and complex charge.'3 He was young, inexperienced
and uneducated. He knew nothing of law and had no previous ex-
perience in a criminal court. Under the Betts Doctrine, these are
exactly the circumstances which "will render criminal proceedings
without counsel so apt to result in injustice as to be fundamentally
unfair." Johnson would seem to be entitled to counsel at state
expense under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
Of course, the Nebraska trial judge told defendant Johnson
that he was "entitled to be represented by counsel" and it might
be argued that Nebraska has therefore discharged its duty under
due process and that defendant waived his right to counsel. It is
submitted, however, that due process not only requires the state
trial judge to offer counsel at state expense under the circumstances
of this case but also to make sure that any waiver of counsel is
intelligently made. 14 In order for a waiver to be intelligent it
must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges,
was held unable to defend himself in a state court because of the com-
plicated jurisdictional question. Cf. Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471
(1945); Tompkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485 (1945); House v. Mayo, 324
U.S. 42 (1945).
12 358 U.S. 633 (1959).
13 Defendant pleaded guilty to a violation of NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-414
(Reissue 1956): "Whoever forcibly, and by violence, or by putting in fear,
takes from the person of another any money or personal property, of any
value whatever, with the intent to rob or steal, shall be deemed guilty of
robbery, and upon conviction thereof shall be imprisoned [from three to
fifty years]." There are suggestions in appellant's brief that defendant
came into possession of the money while attempting to prevent complain-
ing witness from committing rape on a third person. Brief of Appellant,
p. 5, Johnson v. State, 169 Neb. 783, 100 N.W.2d 844 (1960).
14 Jenkins v. State, 57 N.J. Super. 93, 154 A.2d 29 (1959), citing a leading
case on this point: Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948).
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the range of allowable punishments, the possible defenses, and the
circumstances in mitigation thereof. 15 Due process requires that
the state trial judge make certain that the "waiver is under-
standingly and wisely made [and this can be done] only from a
penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the circum-
stances under which the plea is made."'6
Carter v. Illinois17 is a good example of a complete discharge
of the state's duty to examine the waiver. The trial judge there
explained to defendant the consequences of a plea of guilty, his
right to have a lawyer appointed by the court, his right to a trial
before a jury and the degree of proof that would be required to
justify a verdict of guilty after a plea of not guilty. Defendant
insisted, -however, that he wanted to plead guilty, and since there
were no facts showing immaturity or inability to comprehend,
the plea was accepted and the judgment of conviction affirmed.
Certainly the action of the trial judge on Johnson's arraign-
ment did not measure up to these standards. In the first place, the
most that the record shows is that defendant was informed of a
right "to be represented by counsel" and the judge's actual words
are not of record. Secondly, a fair reading of the United States
Supreme Court cases requires that every reasonable presumption
be indulged against a waiver of the right to counsel.' s Furthermore,
although the trial judge said nothing to defendant about counsel
at state expense, there would still be no intelligent waiver even on
the assumption that the judge had done so, if, as the defendant
contended, the trial judge subsequently allowed defendant's mother
to explain, "The boy says 'no' we'll not have a lawyer, we can't
afford it!" 9 In such a case the judge would have known that de-
15 Jenkins v. State, 57 N.J. Super. 93, 124, 154 A.2d 29, 46 (1959).
16Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948). It should be noted that Von
Moltke is a federal case laying down a rule which has been adopted in
New Jersey.
17 329 U.S. 173 (1946). For an exhaustive analysis, see Annot., Duty to
Advise Accused as to Right to Assistance of Counsel, 3 A.L.R.2d 1003
(1949), and supplements.
18 Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942). "To preserve the protec-
tion of the Bill of Rights for hard-pressed defendants, we indulge every
reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental rights." Id.
at 70. As examples of state courts which refuse to indulge in presump-
tions of regularity, see Gholson v. Commonwealth, 308 Ky. 82, 212 S.W.2d
537 (1948); Stonebreaker v. Smyth, 187 Va. 250, 46 S.E.2d 406 (1948).
Contra, Edgemon v. State, 195 Tenn. 496, 500, 260 S.W.2d 262, 264 (1953);
People v. Brown, 397 Ill. 529, 74 N.E.2d 706 (1947).
19 Brief of Appellant, p. 15, Johnson v. State, 169 Neb. 783, 100 N.W.2d 844
(1960).
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fendant and his parents did not fully understand his right to counsel
at state expense and could not have made a "penetrating and com-
prehensive examination of all the circumstances" under which
defendant waived his right. Allowing the waiver under such cir-
cumstances would probably amount to a denial of due process.
But assuming the above analysis of the instant case to be in-
correct, (either because Betts does not apply or because defendant
intelligently waived his right to counsel), one other federal con-
stitutional consideration remains-equal protection of the law.20
Nebraska offers to all indigent criminal defendants accused of a
felony the right to be represented by court appointed counsel.
But the practical effect of the instant case is to provide counsel
only where the judge happens to inform the accused fully of his
right or where the accused happens to know that "entitled to
counsel" means counsel at state expense. Such haphazard enforce-
ment of constitutional rights may well deny equal protection of
the law.21 If so, Nebraska was under an equal-protection duty to
offer this defendant counsel at state expense.
B. NEBRASKA'S STATE DUTY
Let us now assume the absence of any federal constitutional
questions in Johnson. The question of state law still remains. Is
the decision sound in the light of relevant social policy and other
state decisions under comparable local law? Article I, section 11,
of the Nebraska Constitution provides:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person or by counsel ...
Section 29-1803 of the Nebraska Statutes provides in part:
When any person shall be indicted for an offense which is capital
or punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, the court is
hereby authorized and required to assign to such person counsel not
20 "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
21 The leading recent case, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), held that
a refusal to grant appeal solely because defendant was too poor to buy
a transcript was a denial of equal protection of the law. The holding
has been extended to require counsel for an indigent's appeal. People
v. Pitts, 6 N.Y.2d 288, 160 N.E.2d 523 (1959). See also Annot., 55 A.L.R.2d
1072, 1085 (1957). The possibility that Griffin requires counsel in mis-
demeanor cases is discussed in 48 CALIF. L. REV. 501 (1960), and in
11 W. RES. L. REV. 649 (1960).
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exceeding two, if the prisoner has not the ability to procure coun-
sel....
Looking at these provisions alone, one would expect that a
Nebraska judge would have a duty under state law to inform
"such persons" of their right to counsel at state expense. How-
ever, Nebraska case law is otherwise.
22 In Alexander v. O'Grady,23
for instance, the Nebraska Supreme Court interpreted the above
statute to mean that failure to insist on the right to counsel is an
implied waiver of the right. This is true, of course, only where
the right to counsel under state law is involved. Where the Betts
Doctrine applies, failure to request counsel is not a waiver.
24
There is some support in other states for Nebraska's inter-
pretation. New York's statute, for instance, provides that if de-
fendant appears without counsel "he must be asked if he desires
aid of counsel. ' 25 People v. Fink,26 a burglary and petit larceny
case, is the latest in a line of cases involving a misunderstanding
of the judge's explanation under this statute.2 7 The following in-
structions were held to be adequate:
Q. You are entitled to a lawyer and a trial, if you so desire, or you
can plead guilty or not guilty.
A. I plead guilty to the case.28
The defendant's "personal interpretation of the advice he was
given . . . is not good ground for relief. ' 29 This line of cases, how-
ever, is weakened by People v. Hinsch30 where the defendant stated:
Q. Do I understand that if I ask for counsel, my bail will be re-
voked?
A. I don't know that this is so, but if you are prepared to proceed
without counsel, you may do so.3 1
22 Compare the following cases: In re Carper, 144 Neb. 623, 14 N.W.2d 225
(1944); Duggan v. Olson, 146 Neb. 248, 19 N.W.2d 353 (1945); Hawk v.
State, 151 Neb. 717, 39 N.W.2d 561 (1950); and of course the instant case,
Johnson v. State, 169 Neb. 783, 100 N.W.2d 844 (1960).
23 137 Neb. 645, 290 N.W. 718 (1940).
24 See note 18 supra.
25 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §§ 8, 308.
26 8 App. Div. 2d 859, 186 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1959).
27 People v. Crimini, 278 App. Div. 998, 105 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1951); People v.
Ivers, 285 App. Div. 845, 136 N.Y.S.2d 748 (1955).
28 People v. Fink, 8 App. Div. 2d 859, 860, 186 N.Y.S.2d 825, 826 (1959).
29 Ibid.
30 3 App. Div. 915, 162 N.Y.S.2d 602 (1957).
31 Id. at 916, 162 N.Y.S.2d at 603.
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On appeal it was held that these remarks were sufficiently mis-
leading to amount to misinformation and that the line of cases
culminating in the Fink case was not therefore controlling.
Other states have given a contrary interpretation to statutory
provisions similar to those of New York and Nebraska. 32 South
Dakota provides that the accused "must be informed by the court
that it is his right to have counsel. 3 3 In a recent case, 34 involving
a 21 year-old Nebraska resident charged with molesting a minor
child, the South Dakota Court held the following instructions to
be insufficient:
Q. You are, in addition, advised that you are entitled to be repre-
sented by an attorney at all stages of the case if you so desire
... do you understand these rights?
A. I believe I do, Your Honor.35
Since he was not informed that the court would appoint counsel
for him, his waiver of the right to counsel was involuntary and
unintelligent.
The North Dakota statute provides: "If he desires and is
unable to employ counsel, the court must assign counsel. '36 This
statute was interpreted to require that one accused of first degree
murder must be informed of his right to counsel at state expense.
The following conversation was fatally defective:
Q. Do you also understand that you have a legal right to hire an
attorney and fight this case through the courts?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Do you wish that?
A. No, Sir.37
Although the court could have reached this result under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it chose to rely
solely on an interpretation of the above quoted statute.
32 For a fairly complete discussion of the conflicting views, see BEANY,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 94-98. See also Note, 34 NEB. L. REV. 711 (1955);
Note, Duty to Advise Minor Defendant, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 797 (1935).
Representative authorities are collected in WHARTON, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 2015 (1957).
33 S.D. CODE § 34.3506 (1939).
34 State v. Jameson, 91 N.W.2d 743 (S.D. 1958).
35 Id. at 744.
36 N.D. REV. CODE § 29-1303 (1943).
37 State v. Magrum, 76 N.D. 527, 545, 38 N.W.2d 358, 367 (1949).
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Indiana does not even have a statute. However, its constitution
provides that "accused shall have the right to be heard by himself
and counsel."38 Compare Nebraska's constitution, which provides
that "accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person
or by counsel." 39 What duty does this language impose on the
trial judge? In Winn v. State,40 an Indiana trial judge said to a
defendant charged with armed robbery:
Q. Do you have an attorney?
A. No, Sir.
Q. Do you want one?
A. No, Sir.41
The court held that this was not an intelligent waiver. The
language of the opinion shows a keen insight into the relationship
of the federal Constitution to the Indiana Constitution:
Both this court and the United States Supreme Court have consist-
ently held that, there can be no valid judgment against a defend-
ant in a criminal case unless he has been offered, and, if so desired,
provided with adequate counsel .... The court erred in failing to
advise appellant, on his arraignment, that he was entitled to have
competent counsel represent him at public expense if he was with-
out money, means, or credit to pay for it himself.
42
In short the trial judge was under a duty to advise defendant of
his right to counsel at state expense.
The South Dakota, North Dakota, and Indiana cases are prob-
ably representative of the better-reasoned weight of authority.
Imposing a duty on the trial judge to inform defendants of right
to counsel at state expense is no extra burden on the judge and
obviates the expense of processing appeals of improper trials.
43
Finally such a duty eliminates the possibility of federal reversal
on the ground that absence of counsel denied due process of law.
38 IND. CONST. art. 1, § 13.
39 NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
40 232 Ind. 70, 111 N.E.2d 653 (1953).
41 Id. at 72, 111 N.E.2d at 655.
42 Id. (Emphasis added).
43 Statistics show that the number of in forma pauperis petitions to the
United States Supreme Court increased four-fold between 1939 and 1949.
See BEANEY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 202.
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III. DEFINITION OF INDIGENCY
The Johnson case raises an additional question of whether de-
fendant, even if he had the right, could qualify for counsel at state
expense. The statute provides counsel "if the person has not the
ability to procure counsel. '44 How does a judge determine ability
to procure counsel?
Usually, indigency is a question of fact 45 and will depend on
a number of factors including whether the case is civil or criminal.46
Other courts have held in criminal cases that the presence of rich
relatives is immaterial,47 that the possession of some property or
income is not controlling,48 and that the fact that the defendant
began with counsel will not foreclose appointment of counsel when
his funds are later exhausted. 49
Fisher v. State50 involved a Nebraska statute which provides
free transcripts in criminal appeals if the defendant is unable to
pay.51 The appellant in that case obtained a free transcript even
though her husband was employed and earning fifty dollars a week.
In the civil area the leading case is Adkins v. E. I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. 52 There petitioner stated that she was a widow 74
years of age, that she had a home appraised at 3,450 dollars, that her
only source of income was rent from parts of her home and that
without such income she would be unable to purchase the neces-
sities of life. The estimated cost of her appeal was 4,000 dollars. The
United States Supreme Court held:
We cannot agree with the court below that one must be absolutelydestitute to enjoy the benefits of this statute .... To say that no
persons are entitled to the statute's benefits until they have sworn
44 NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1803 (Reissue 1956).
45 State v. Hill, 239 Iowa 675, 32 N.W.2d 398 (1948); United States v. Gicinto,
114 F. Supp. 929 (W.D. Mo. 1953).
46 The subject is generally discussed in 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1710
(1940), and in the Digest system under Criminal Law key 1077.
47 Rastralli v. State, 76 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 1954).
48 Compare Gaston v. State, 106 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1958), with Braden v. Com-
monwealth, 277 S.W.2d 7 (Ky. 1955).
49 Cash v. Cluver, 358 U.S. 633 (1959).
50 153 Neb. 226, 43 N.W.2d 600 (1959). See also Altis v. State, 109 Neb. 776,
192 N.W. 327 (1923), where the court held that the judge can hear testi-
mony on the question of poverty and also on the question of whether
defendant has by his own act made himself unable to pay.
51 NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-342 (Reissue 1956).
52 335 U.S. 331 (1948).
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to contribute . . . the last dollar they have or can get . . . would
be to . . . throw its beneficiaries into the category of public
charges. 53
To the extent that these precedents are applicable to the instant
case, this defendant is probably "unable to pay." The State's brief,
to be sure, points out:
It strikes one as amazing that a family with the father working,
which owns its own home and automobile, would balance the scale
of justice with a pocket book, only seeking legal service if it were
free.54
On the other hand, defendant testified that he himself did not
have the money and that his parents would have to mortgage their
home to raise the money.55 Perhaps the fact that his parents could
or would help is immaterial 56 but if not, then certainly his parents
run the risk of joining the defendant's wife and child as public
charges if they mortgage all they have to raise the money.
This does not, of course, totally dispose of the problem of
defining indigency. Should the judge consider such factors as
that a defendant is about to inherit a large estate, that rich but re-
jected relatives are willing to hire an attorney, that the defendant
could pay part of the expenses, or that the defendant is himself
an attorney and does not need one appointed? The most satisfac-
tory answer to each question is beyond the scope of this comment,
57
but it is submitted that each case should depend on the amount
of money required, the nature of the proceeding, the availability
of other means of securing defendant's rights and the seriousness
of the consequences which would follow a denial of his right to
proceed as an indigent.
53 Id. at 339. This language was relied on in a New Jersey case, where the
plaintiff and his wife did not work but lived on an income of less than
$1,000 a year derived from rented rooms in a semi-apartment house.
"Thus the plaintiff is not wholly destitute but if the house had to be sold
to pay for the costs of the appeal, he might well become a public charge."
Sejeck v. Singer Mfg. Co., 113 F. Supp. 281 (D.N.J. 1953).
54 Brief of Appellee, p. 18, Johnson v. State, 169 Neb. 783, 100 N.W.2d 844
(1960).
55 Brief of Appellant, p. 14, Johnson v. State, 169 Neb. 783, 100 N.W.2d 844
(1960).
56 Rastralli v. State, 76 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 1954).
57A good beginning, in addition to note 46 supra, would be Annot., 55
A.L.R.2d 1072, 1085 (1957), and the annotated statutes under forma
pauperis.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The instant case is unsound as a matter of federal and state
law. Defendant, because of age, inexperience, indigency and the
serious charge against him had a federal right to appointed counsel.
Failure to inform him fully of this right made his waiver unin-
telligent and permitting such a waiver denied him due process and
equal protection. Furthermore, the decision appears to be unsound
as a matter of local Nebraska law.58 To obviate such cases as
Johnson, the Nebraska Statutes should be amended to include a
clear statement of the judge's duty to advise defendants fully of
all their rights, to provide for a complete record at the arraignment
stage, and to provide a clear definition of what circumstances
amount to "indigency."
Richard E. Gee, '62
58 In addition, it seems unfair. "There is something wrong with a system
of Government which rations justice in accordance with the thickness of
a man's wallet." Messerman, Indigent's Right to Counsel on Appeal, 11
W. RES. L. REV. 649, 660 (1960).
